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QUANTIFICATION OF HARM IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
INTRODUCTION 
 This paper briefly discussed the theory and the experience that United States 
courts and antitrust scholarship have encountered with respect to quantification of harm 
in antitrust cases.  This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, 
and to the remedial damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has 
developed. 
In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States 
are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government.1  Further, when the 
individual states in our federal system file their actions under federal antitrust law they 
are entitled to assert claims for damages as well.2  The vast majority of private antitrust 
actions in the United States include a claim for damages.  It is little wonder, because the 
private damages provision, §4 of the Clayton Act, grants trebled (threefold) damages, 
plus attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in 
relevant part that: 
 any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district 
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or 
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, 
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.3 
 This section has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to permit 
lawsuits by ordinary consumers4 as well as business firms, and to require proof of a 
                                            
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA.  Herbert-
hovenkamp@uiowa.edu; 319-335-9079. 
1 See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412006.pdf. (last visited Jan. 25, 2011)  The data, which go 
through 2006 show percentages of private actions from 1995-2006 ranging from 89% to 96%.  The data 
do not include Federal Trade Commission challenges that never go into a district court. 
2 15 U.S.C. §15c (2006). 
3 15 U.S.C. §15 (2006). 
4 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). 
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violation plus causation in fact.5  It expressly requires that compensation be measured 
by reference to the plaintiff’s losses (damages “by him sustained”) rather than by 
alternative measures that one might view as superior.  Under the Seventh Amendment 
to the United States Constitution all damages actions such as these must go to a jury of 
laypersons if either party so requests, and the jury’s job will be to interpret all admissible 
expert testimony and compute damages, subject only to judicial control for ignoring 
instructions or reaching irrational verdicts.  Trebling is mandatory and jurors are not 
instructed about trebling, for fear that they will temper their awards so as to reflect its 
consequences.6  Of course, jurors are laypersons with various degrees of knowledge 
about the antitrust system, and certainly some of them may know about trebling.7  
Suffice it to say that the intervention of a jury does not serve to make damages 
outcomes in U.S. cases more rational. 
COMPENSATION vs. DETERENCE 
 As noted above, the damages measure authorized by the Clayton Act is based 
purely on compensation, and Congress has never seriously considered changing it.  As 
it turns out, compensation for losses is rarely the measure that is also sufficient to 
produce the optimal level of deterrence. 
 As a basic premise, damages measured with deterrence as a goal should seek 
to be large enough to deprive an antitrust violator of reasonably anticipated improperly 
obtained gains plus a little more, adjusted by the probability of detection and 
prosecution.  For example, suppose a cartel sold 1 million units at a cartel overcharge of 
10 € per unit, and thus earned total profits of 10 million €, ignoring all costs of 
administering the cartel, internal inefficiencies resulting from misdirected output, and the 
like.8  Because that 10 million € gain to cartel members is identical to the overcharge, 
optimal damages measured ex post would be 10 million € plus a small amount so that 
the conduct is unprofitable.  However, suppose that only one in three cartels is detected 
and successfully prosecuted.  In that case, considered ex ante, the correct rule would 
be treble damages.  That is, the trebled overcharge is the correct rule assuming that the 
                                            
5 See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶337-340 (3d ed. 2007 & 
Supp.). 
6 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 22 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1994); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, 
A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 989 (5th Cir. 1977). 
7 E.g., Cape Cod Food Prods. V. Nat’l Cranberry Ass’n,, 119 F.Supp. 900 (D.Mass. 1954) (jury 
instruction to disregard anything they think they might know about trebling) 
8 On the problems and costs of cartel administration, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, §§4.1 – 4.3 (3d ed. 2011). 
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probability of detection is one in three.  To generalize, the optimal damage award is the 
overcharge multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection and successful 
prosecution.9 
 Some antitrust violations produce efficiencies, or cost savings, even as they 
injure competition.  A good example is mergers, where costs savings can be significant 
but very difficult to prove.  Another is practices such as tying, which may increase 
welfare just as they are unlawful.10  Theoretically we might say that these are cases of 
incorrect application of antitrust rules.  Be that as it may, however, damages must be 
quantified in any case where damages are deemed appropriate.  In such cases the sum 
of the overcharge plus the monopoly “deadweight loss” is the correct measure to 
deter.11  For example, suppose that a merger produces 3 million € in overcharges but 1 
million € in efficiency gains.  Assume that the price increase causes not only a 3 million 
€ overcharge, but also a deadweight loss of 2 million €, which results from customers 
who switch to an inferior product in response to the higher post-merger prices.  We 
characterize this as a deadweight loss because the consumers lose by making an 
inferior choice, but the merger partners also lose because they earn nothing on unmade 
sales.  In this case the optimal penalty is 3 (overcharge) + 2 (deadweight loss), or 5 
million €.  Because the merging partners earn 4 million € on the merger (3 million in 
overcharges and 1 million in efficiency savings) the merger is unprofitable and will be 
deterred. 
 Suppose, however, that the deadweight loss is only 500,000 €.  In that case the 
penalty of overcharge plus deadweight loss will be insufficient to deter the merger 
because the efficiency gains are greater than the deadweight loss imposed by the 
merger.  Everything else is a pure wealth transfer.  As a result, the merger will proceed, 
consistent with the proposition that it is socially beneficial even though it results in some 
consumer harm.  If the principal concern of competition policy were stated as consumer 
welfare rather than general economic welfare12 this would still be the correct measure.  
                                            
9 See id., §§ 17.2 – 17.3. 
10 Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ.L.REV. 
924 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284. 
11 See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.CHI.L.REV. 652 (1983); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1988).   
12 General welfare is concerned with the welfare of all persons affected, while consumer welfare is 
concerned only with the welfare of consumers, ignoring that of producers. 
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The consumers would still recover their losses, but the merger would go forward if the 
efficiency gains exceeded the deadweight loss.13 
 This optimal deterrence model is not even a close approximation of the reality of 
damage measures in the United States, and probably for good reason.  Several 
observations about it are possible: 
1.  Even in the case of a simple naked cartel producing no efficiency gains 
whatsoever, the overcharge measure produces optimal deterrence only if we 
have some way of knowing ex ante what the probability of detection and 
successful prosecution is.  Trebled damages under United States law would be 
about right if the probability of cartel detection were .33.  In all probability, 
however, the detection rate is not higher than .2, making a trebling multiplier too 
low.14  In other cases such as mergers, however, the probability of detection is 
100% because the merger is a public rather than a concealed act.  In such cases 
trebled damages are probably excessive.  In sum, trebling damages for all types 
of violations is not particularly rational, given the great differences in probability of 
detection. 
2. As soon as an antitrust violation has a significant possibility of producing 
efficiency gains the optimal penalty must include the deadweight loss, assuming 
that deterrence of practices only to the extent they are inefficient is the 
appropriate goal.  However, measuring deadweight loss in a courtroom is 
extraordinarily difficult.  Theoretically, one could get it by permitting consumers 
who substitute away from the overpriced product to have a damage action.  For 
example, if in response to a price-increasing merger of two luxury car makers a 
consumer switched to a third seller’s intermediate car, she could recover the loss 
in consumers’ surplus she suffered as a result of the substitution.  Such a system 
would be extremely hard to manage.  United States law denies standing to such 
persons.15 
                                            
13 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, ___ ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL ___ 
(forthcoming, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679849. 
14 Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International Cartels through 
Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA.J.INT’L L. 57 (2010).  The European Commission has estimated detection 
rates as in the range of 10 to 20 percent.  See Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, at 22, SEC (2008) 404 (Apr. 2, 2008), 
available at http:// ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/working_ 
paper.pdf. 
15 Montreal Trading, Inc. v. AMAX, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 
(1982) (nonpurchaser who substituted away in response to price increase lacked standing to sue). 
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3. The optimal deterrence model moves even further away from reality when the 
plaintiff is a competitor rather than a consumer and the measure of damages is 
lost profits or lost opportunity to do business.  Competitor losses depend on such 
things as the technology in an industry, the nature of the offense, whether the 
competitor was well established and driven out of business, whether its plant and 
equipment could be resold or had to be destroyed or sold for salvage, whether 
the competitor lost and will be entitled to recover future, unmade profits, to name 
a few.  Once computed, this number could be either far greater or far smaller 
than the optimal amount of deterrence.  For example, in a predatory pricing case 
that ruins a rival and results in a sustained period of higher prices, deterrence 
would be accomplished by capturing the net gains to the predator.  This number 
has no quantifiable relationship to the value of the rival’s lost business. 
4. The overcharge plus deadweight loss methodology does not pick up the true 
social cost of anticompetitive behavior to the extent that unlawful acts cause 
harm that is not reflected in product pricing and output decisions.  Most notably, 
the social cost includes not only the monopoly deadweight lost but also any lost 
investment or productivity by actual or potential rivals.  For example, suppose a 
dominant firm files an improper patent infringement suit in order to retain its 
monopoly position.  The social cost is not only the effects resulting from 
extension of the dominant firm’s monopoly but also the rival’s lost investment 
plus the value of any superior technology that might be deterred or prevented by 
the anticompetitive act.16 
OVERCHARGE INJURIES AND PASSING-ON 
 An intuitively stronger relationship exists between optimal deterrence and 
compensation that is based on an overcharge, as opposed to compensation based on 
the lost profits of excluded rivals.  Overcharge measures are injuries that are suffered 
by consumers, both direct and indirect.  Theoretically they are superior for achieving 
optimal deterrence regardless of the identity of the plaintiff.  As a result, one might 
conceive of a system in which the plaintiff was an excluded rival (challenging predatory 
pricing, improper enforcement of IPRs, etc) but the damages were based on the 
overcharge.  In effect, rivals would be suing but they would be collecting someone 
else’s damages, namely those suffered by consumers.  In any event, the U.S. Clayton 
Act would not permit such a measure and it seems to conflict with a basic tort premise 
that injured plaintiffs are entitled to their own damages. 
                                            
16 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra, § 1.3d (4th ed. 2011); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN 
AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN 
INNOVATION, chs. 2-3 (N.Y. & London: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011, forthcoming). 
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 The most interesting issues respecting overcharge damages are (1) 
methodologies of measurement, and (2) passing on problems. 
Methodologies of Measurement 
 In United States antitrust law the most common methods of measurement seek 
to compare the market in which the violation occurred with some alternative market (in 
space, time, or product) that was free of the antitrust violation.  For example, the so-
called “yardstick” method compares prices, performance, or some other index of harm 
in the violation market with the same variable in some alternative, or “yardstick” market 
that is assumed to be performing competitively.  To illustrate, if liquor sellers in one 
Texas city are engaged in price fixing, one might measure damages by comparing 
prices in this city during the cartel period with prices in a reasonably similar city where 
price fixing is assumed not to be occurring.17  By contrast, the “before and after” method 
looks exclusively at the violation market, but tries to compare prices, output, or some 
other index from the period prior to or subsequent to the violation period (or preferably 
both).  For example, if a cartel formed July 1, 2007 and dissolved July 1, 2010, one 
might compare prices during the cartel period with prices immediately before the cartel 
was formed or immediately after it fell apart.18 
 Both methods have become technically quite demanding and typically require the 
use of an expert trained in the use of statistics.  Even in the hands of a qualified expert, 
both suffer from severe limitations depending on the circumstances.  For example, two 
yardstick markets are not likely to have entirely identical cost structures, wage rates, 
and the like.  As a result, adjustments will have to be made.  Further, often a cartel 
operates to “stabilize” prices without really increasing prevailing prices; as a result, the 
before and after method might understate harm.  In addition, exogenous factors such as 
mergers, changes in technology, the overall health of the economy can all affect these 
measures.  Over the years economists and statisticians have developed control 
techniques to deal with these problems or others, but no one believes that the 
methodologies provide more than a rough approximation of reality. 
Passing On Problems 
 Most but not all cartels sell to various intermediaries rather than end users.  
Further, the price-fixed product is often only one component of a finished product, and 
the effect of the fix may pass down through a distribution chain in complex ways.  For 
                                            
17E.g.,  Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Assn., 721 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1983) (employing yardstick 
method).  On use of the methodology by experts, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ROGER D. BLAIR, AND CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶395 (3d ed. 2007). 
18 Id., ¶395. 
Hovenkamp                                             Quantification of Harm                                        Feb. 2011, page 7 
example, in the infamous vitamin cartel case the product whose price was fixed was 
vitamins administered to cattle and other livestock.19  Depending on the particular 
vitamin and the market situation, these price-fixed vitamins could be sold to a distributor 
who resold them in the same form to a feed mill.  The feed mill then mixed the vitamins 
into cattle feed which it sold perhaps to a second level distributor and then to a dealer.  
Farmers then purchased the feed containing the cartelized vitamins.  The effect was to 
increase farmers’ costs and thus they charged more for the beef or milk that they 
produced.  This beef or milk was then sold to distributors or retail grocers, who then sold 
them to consumers.  Very likely these price fixed vitamins passed through a half dozen 
or more intermediaries before the higher price came to rest with end users.  The degree 
of pass-on depends on a variety of factors, including whether the proportions of the 
price-fixed product can be varied and whether the priced fixed good is a fixed cost or 
variable cost item in an intermediary’s operations. 
 Not all distribution chains are this complex.  When passing on occurs, however, it 
is likely that most of the overcharge is passed on, while some smaller amount is 
retained by each person in the distribution chain.  For example, a large grocer might 
routinely follow a formula in which it adds 10% to the wholesale price that it pays when 
selling the product at retail.  Indeed, in this particular case the intermediary actually 
makes more money on the marked up product.  For example, if the noncartel wholesale 
price was 30 € the retail price would be 33€.  However, if the cartel increases the 
wholesale price to 40 € the retail price would be 44€ and the retailer would earn a profit 
of 4€ rather than 3€.  More generally, the impact of the price increase is to reduce sales, 
and ordinarily an intermediary responds to reduced demand by reducing its markup 
(although high fixed costs may prevent this).  So about the best general conclusion one 
can draw is that intermediaries typically absorb some relatively small portion of the 
overcharge, sometimes ranging down to zero, while the larger portion of the overcharge 
rests with customers. 
 Note also that there are some severe qualifiers to this general observation.  Most 
significantly, if the cartel and the intermediary operate in different size markets passing 
on may be impossible.  For example, suppose that a local cartel of gasoline retailers 
fixes prices, something they can do because gasoline is costly to transport.  The price 
fixed gasoline is then sold to farmers who grow wheat and sell it in a worldwide market.  
In this case the farmers will very likely absorb the entire loss that results from the price 
                                            
19 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).  For some of the problems, see 
Hans W. Friederiszick and Lars-Hendrik Roller, Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust 
Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases, 6 J.COMPETITION L. & ECON. 595 (2010); Victor P. 
Goldbert, The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick and a Hard Place, 2009 COLUMBIA L.REV. 
785 (2009). 
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fix because they are purchasing in a cartelized market but reselling in a competitive 
market.  So nothing will be passed on.  A similar result can occur when the cartelized 
good is a fixed cost to the intermediary.  For example, the construction brick that was 
the subject of price-fixing in the Illinois Brick case would be a variable cost to the price-
fixers and to contractors who used the brick in construction projects, but it would be a 
fixed cost item to a factory owner who built a durable production facility with the brick.  
Fixed costs are typically not passed on at all, or else they are accounted for only 
indirectly in ways that have little to do with actual incremental costs.  For example, it is 
very difficult to say how an overcharge in bricks used to build a commercial bakery 
would show up in the way that the baker priced its bread. 
 In sum, not only are passing on problems very complex, they are also quite 
specific to the situation.  In some cases everything is passed on.  In other cases nothing 
is. 
 Today United States antitrust law on this issue is in a turbulent state.  In the 
Illinois Brick decision, now 35 years old, the Supreme Court held that under federal 
antitrust law direct purchasers are entitled to obtain the entire overcharge as damages, 
without any reduction for damages that were passed on rather than absorbed.20  As a 
consequence, indirect purchasers were not entitled to obtain anything, except in a few 
narrowly defined circumstances.21  In subsequent years, however, the Supreme Court 
also permitted state antitrust laws to deviate by recognizing indirect purchaser claims.22  
As of now roughly half of the states, including very large ones such as California, 
recognize indirect purchaser claims.  This has created a very cumbersome situation in 
which these claims must be coordinated and the possibility of excessive damages must 
be recognized.23 
 The Illinois Brick rule was based on two premises, both of which today seem 
quite questionable.  The first premise was that the need to measure passing on by using 
incidence and shifting theory, as typically involved in tax policy, made quantification of 
pass on extraordinarily difficult.  The second was that concentrating all of the damages 
                                            
20 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  See also Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp United, 
Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990) (applying indirect purchaser rule to public utility that passed on entire 
monopoly overcharge). 
21 These are spelled out in 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶346. 
22California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
23 Most recently, see Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758, 233 P.3d 1066 (Cal. 2010), a California 
Supreme Court decision holding that the direct purchaser’s recovery should not be reduced by the amount 
it passed on, at least in circumstances where the absent indirect purchasers no longer had the right to sue. 
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into a single level rather than having damages sliced up into numerous pieces would 
increase incentives to enforce.24 
 On the first premise, technical measurement of passing on of a fee, tax or 
overcharge depends on the elasticity of supply and demand faced by each individual 
intermediary.  These methodologies can provide useful information about how a tax, 
such as a sales tax or VAT, is passed on from one business to another in a distribution 
chain.  However, this theory is very difficult to use in litigation.  But the prevailing 
methodologies used in antitrust litigation, the aforementioned “yardstick” and “before 
and after” methods, do not necessarily require computation of these elasticities at all, 
but simply comparative observations of pricing in two different markets or two different 
time periods.25 
 On the second premise, while it is true that the indirect purchaser rule 
concentrates the entire damages action in the direct purchaser, the first purchaser often 
has a business relationship with the defendant that makes it an unlikely plaintiff.  
Indirect purchasers rarely face such concerns.  Further, the availability of class actions 
or, in some cases, assignment, can serve to mitigate coordination problems by 
concentrating numerous damage claims into a single suitor.26 
 Clearly, however, the system currently in place in the United States, in which 
direct purchaser claims are lodged mainly in the federal courts under federal law, and 
indirect purchaser claims are brought under state law, is cumbersome and irrational.  A 
better system would consolidate all purchasers who are injured into a single forum and 
proceeding for purposes of allocating damages.  In sum, any solution to the pass on 
problem should be “comprehensive,” in the sense that it forces all injured parties and 
the defendant(s) into a common proceeding. 
 The following more fundamental conclusions can also be drawn: 
1. When the purchaser from a cartel or unlawful monopolist is an intermediary the 
“overcharge” is rarely the correct measure of that purchaser’s lost.  As noted 
previously, in the typical situation intermediaries pass on most or sometimes 
                                            
24 See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the 
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979); 
William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 
128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274, 1275-1276 (1980); Jeffrey Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the 
Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979). 
25 See 3A AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶346k. 
26 See id., ¶331 (class actions), ¶362 (assignment). 
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even all of the overcharge.  The real source of injury to intermediaries is lost 
sales volume.  For example, an intermediary that routinely uses formula markups 
will typically pass on the entire overcharge, but because the cartel restricts output 
it will experience a loss in sales volume.  Its real injury in such cases consists of 
lost profits from these unmade sales.  The end user, by contrast, absorbs the full 
brunt of the overcharge because it has nothing to pass on.   Even in this case the 
“overcharge” is not the full measure of the end user’s harm.  End users are also 
injured because they purchase fewer units of the cartelized good and may 
substitute to a good that they would have regarded as inferior if the market had 
been competitive. 
2. Apropos of this, a superior method of assessing compensation in a cartel case 
with multi-layer distribution would be (1) the passed on overcharge to the end 
user consumer; and (2) lost profits to each intermediary in the distribution chain.  
The latter measure would include both absorption of loss on markup and also 
losses resulting from reduced volume. 
To illustrate: prior to the cartel a retailer intermediary took a 
markup of 10 € per unit and sold 1000 units.  During the cartel 
period the retailer responded to increased pressure by cutting its 
markup to 9 € and selling 800 units.  Its damage in that case would 
be 1 € per unit on the 800 units that it sold, plus lost profits on the 
200 unsold units.  This would consist primarily of gross margins on 
the unsold units, less selling expenses. 
Conclusion 
 United States antitrust law has developed a rich and full record of experience 
with private antitrust remedies.  In the process it has also made serious mistakes that 
should be avoided.  Some of these mistakes are the consequence of a federal system 
that often forces division of private enforcement prerogatives among different 
jurisdictions that use inconsistent approaches.  Others are simple mistakes of 
conception or measurement that are often difficult to reverse once they have been 
established.  This makes United States experience a fruitful ground for study. 
 
 
